Heidegger – Being and Time Chpt 3 – The Worldhood of the World

February 19, 2014 — Leave a comment

The Worldhood of the World

Being-in-the-World has structure. The world is made up of ‘entities’ within the world. We want to see what shows itself in these entities. The first port-of-call is to catalogue things that ‘are’ in the world: houses, trees, people, mountains, stars. This is pre-phenomenological (as everydayness is pre-ontological for Heidegger: ontological is to think about being). So how do we move from a pre-phenomenological state to a phenomenological investigation? We are seeking the Being of those entities which are present at hand within the world. Entities within the world are things. Things can be things of nature and can be things invested with value (the hammer). Being which belongs to Things is substantiality. Asking ontologically about substantiality cannot lead to the phenomenon that is the world:

“Nature is itself an entity which is encountered within the world and which can be discovered in various ways and at various stages.” (p92)

The second port-of-call is to attach ourselves to those entities with which Dasein for the most part dwells. Objects which are invested with value. Thus far we have: ontical depiction of entities within the world and ontological interpretation of their Being. Neither activity propels us further toward the phenomenon of the world. In both these the world has been presupposed.

Worldhood (a structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world) is a characteristic of Dasein itself. Dasein is not separate from Worldhood. Failing to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein means that the phenomenon of worldhood gets passed over. Heidegger proposes then that we interpret the world in terms of the Being of those entities which are present at hand within the world but which are not discovered in terms of nature.

Why this rejection of present-at-hand objects proximal to nature?

Three stages of analysis:

1) the analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general
2) an illustrative contrast between our analysis of worldhood and Descartes ontology of the world
3) the aroundness of the environment, and the spatiality of Dasein.

1) the analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general

We have dealings in the world with entities within the world. Rather than a bare perceptual cognition these dealings are the kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use.

Conclusion points:

The present at hand view can’t allow the world to show itself.

There is a network of practical relations.

The background of the world is unobtrusive/non-obstinate which is practical and important as we try to do things in the world.

How does the world show itself as phenomenon?

When things go wrong (breakdown cases) the context of equipment (things) is lit up and the world reveals itself.


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